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publication of this Symposium will serve to further stimulate thinking and
constructive writing in other journals and in any future symposium on
this subject and to ultimately bring about international sanctions for this
offense. While the tornado and its causes and effects must be left to
meteorologists and natural phenomenologists, the containment of international terrorism can best be achieved through the efforts of international
lawyers, statesmen, legislators and an aroused public, who demand prompt
and effective resolution of this persistent and malignant problem.

COMMENT:
JURIDICAL CONTROL OF TERRORISM
WILLIAM

T. MALLISON*

T

HE PRESENT COMMENT is written upon the basic assumption that the
purpose of the juridical doctrines designed to control terror is to
reduce, and if possible to eliminate, the destruction of human and material
values involved in acts of terror. Professor Bassiouni approaches this
problem through a threefold categorization of terror based upon motivation: first, terror designed to promote the private gain or profit of common
criminals; second, terrorism by the mentally ill, and third, ideologically
motivated terrorism. He deals primarily with the third one. This categorization is useful since it leads directly into a study of the causes of acts of
terror which can in turn provide the basis for more effective control. It is
difficult to see how a start toward effective control can be made without a
fundamental understanding of the causes involved. Such an understanding
does not condone either the causes of terrorism or its results.
Professor Bassiouni has also emphasized a fundamental consideration
in pointing out that particular acts of terrorism must be condemned
without regard to the identification of the perpetrator as an individual, a
group or a government.'
There are also significant considerations in not excusing terroristic
acts because of the governmental identity of terrorists. It is well known
that reciprocity and mutuality in observance of the law, including
the existing proscriptions against terrorism, involves one of the more
effective sanctioning processes. It would be a surprising proposition
if governments, which are the principal authors of the existing international law doctrines, were immunized from the restrictions against
* Professor of Law and Director of the International Law Program, George Washington University.
1 A conception of control of terror, consistent in fundamentals with Professor
Bassiouni's, is developed in W. T. &S. V. MALLISON, The Concept of Public Purpose
Terror in International Law: Doctrines and Sanctions to Reduce the Destruction of
Human and Material Values, 18 HowARw L.J. 12 (1973).
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terrorism while individuals and small groups were to be punished for
similar activities. It would certainly be desirable if politically motivated
individuals and groups were to adhere to all of the criteria of existing
international law without reciprocal observance on the part of governments. Experience has shown, however, that this is not a very likely
outcome. One of the principal sanctions against terror is the same as that
which has operated with some degree of effectiveness in the law of war;
that is, non-discrimination in application and mutuality in observance.
The United States Draft Convention on Terrorism which was
presented to the United Nations General Assembly on September 26,
1972,2 and not acted upon, is adequately illustrative of the fallacies of the
contrary approach. The Draft Convention, in addition to other defects
including ignoring the causes, dealt only with acts of terrorism which
were committed by individuals or small groups and which were directed
against governments. In addition to its moral myopia, it is clear that there
would be no effective way of enforcing this draft. Government officials, in
attempted justification, have of necessity down-graded the importance of
an understanding of the causes of terrorism and stressed only its outward
symptoms. If the same type of discriminatory approach in terms of the
identity of the perpetrators and the immunization of government officials
from law were attempted in a United States municipal statute, it would
be an unconstitutional discrimination which violates the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. Thereafter, on December 18, 1972, the U.S.
Government voted against a General Assembly resolution which, by more
than the two-thirds vote required for important questions, condemned all
kinds of terrorism and emphasized the importance of studying the
underlying causes. 3 Assuming that the U.S. Government is in "good
faith" attempting to control terrorism, its unthinking approach to this
serious problem reminds one of the jingle which recommends: "When
uncertain, when in doubt, run in circles, scream and shout." The government's objective of controlling only some kinds of terror, which it
perceives as emanating from actual or potential enemies, is about as
realistic as would be the attempt to prohibit only some kinds of murder.
Mr. Paust is to be commended for the systematic utilization of a
series of claims categories which are designed to provide a framework for
inquiry to appraise juridically a wide variety of fact situations in relevant
context.4 The recommendations which he advances concerning evenhanded application of existing law, including the doctrines of the laws of
war, without regard to the allegedly desirable characteristics of the political
objectives of particular governments or groups, are calculated to preserve
the efficacy of existing legal doctrines. He rejects the notion that guerrilla
2 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 431 (Oct. 16, 1972).

s U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (XXVII).
4The basic inquiry model has been developed by Professors Lasswell and McDougal
of the Yale Law School.
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warfare should be entirely excluded from legal regulation as a matter of
general principle; and, he is on sound ground in not allowing any and
all acts involved in such warfare to be beyond the reach of law.
Mr. Paust is aware that there is considerable overlap, or indeed
identity, between the doctrines designed to inhibit terror and minimize
unnecessary violence which appear under the label of "terror" and those
which appear under the label of "laws of war." However, while his
emphasis upon the understanding of particular facts in the total context
is helpful in promoting the goals of human dignity and world public
order, his misconceptions concerning the doctrinal content of the laws of
war are not. For example, he finds no proscriptions "which prohibit
terroristic attacks against combatants who are engaged in an armed
conflict." This is an unnecessary and erroneous retreat from the holdings
of the major Nuremberg Trial conducted by the International Military
Tribunal where "war crimes," which could with equal accuracy be
characterized as "acts of terror," were not excused because the victims
were members of armed forces. His conclusion that terror may be
practiced against combatants in armed conflict situations also involves
ignoring the provisions of the first five subdivisions of article 23 of the
venerable Hague Regulations of 1907 which state:
[I]t is especially forbiddena. To employ poison or poisoned weapons;
b. To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the
hostile nation or army.
c. To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or
having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;
d. To declare that no quarter will be given;
e. To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering....
Hague Convention Number IV and its Annexed Regulations 5 comprise
a currently effective multilateral agreement to which the United States
is a party.
Having swallowed the camel of terror, or extreme violence unlimited
by the laws of war, against combatant forces, Mr. Paust then strains at
the gnat of a limited economic embargo to reach the astonishing conclusion
that "Arab cuts of oil to the United States" may be considered as "a
terroristic strategy." One must wonder as to the contextual factors or
doctrinal formulations which lead to this conclusion. If the comprehensive
economic blockade measures employed by the Allies in two World Wars
are examined, they will be seen to have involved the starvation of
5Convention-War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277 (1907), T.S. No. 539 (effective Oct. 18,
1907).
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non-combatants along with combatants.6 If the post-World War II
economic measures of the U.S. Government against its political adversaries
may be deemed as supplying the criteria, there would appear to be
authority for measures rather more severe than those involved in the oil
embargo. A precise precedent for the use of oil as a weapon exists in
President Eisenhower's withholding of oil to Great Britain and France
in 1956 and 1957 as a coercive measure to hasten the withdrawal of
British and French armed forces from Egypt. 7 The recent oil embargo
was invoked, it should be recalled, in response to the United States
Government's massive direct support for Israeli military activities
conducted inside Egypt and Syria. The United States precedents which
have been mentioned provide ample authority to meet the traditional
requirements of international law for responding to coercion which
are preserved as "inherent right" in article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. The conclusion must be that both the necessity for the Arab oil
embargo and its reasonableness and proportionality as responding
coercion, considerably short of what should be characterized as terror, are
well established. There is no doubt but that the elimination of all coercion
is a desirable long-range goal. It must, however, be accorded a lower
priority than the elimination of terror involving extreme violence.
It is clear that further serious study must be given to the problem of
the juridical control of terrorism. Professor Bassiouni and Mr. Paust are
to be commended for advancing an understanding of the difficult problems
which must be solved.

6 The authoritative study of the comprehensive blockade in the Second World War is

MEDLico-r, THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE (2 vols., 1952 and 1959; United Kingdom,
History of the Second World War, Civil Series).
7 See, e.g., K. Lov, SuEz: THE TwicE-FouGor WAR 651-55, 665-66 (1969).
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